Abstract-Cloud computing economically enables customers with limited computational resources to outsource large-scale computations to the cloud. However, how to protect customers' confidential data involved in the computations then becomes a major security concern. In this paper, we present a secure outsourcing mechanism for solving large-scale systems of linear equations (LE) in cloud. Because applying traditional approaches like Gaussian elimination or LU decomposition (aka. direct method) to such large-scale LEs would be prohibitively expensive, we build the secure LE outsourcing mechanism via a completely different approach-iterative method, which is much easier to implement in practice and only demands relatively simpler matrix-vector operations. Specifically, our mechanism enables a customer to securely harness the cloud for iteratively finding successive approximations to the LE solution, while keeping both the sensitive input and output of the computation private. For robust cheating detection, we further explore the algebraic property of matrix-vector operations and propose an efficient result verification mechanism, which allows the customer to verify all answers received from previous iterative approximations in one batch with high probability. Thorough security analysis and prototype experiments on Amazon EC2 demonstrate the validity and practicality of our proposed design.
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INTRODUCTION
I N cloud computing, customers with computationally weak devices are now no longer limited by the slow processing speed, memory, and other hardware constraints, but can enjoy the literally unlimited computing resources in the cloud through the convenient yet flexible pay-per-use manners [2] . Despite the tremendous benefits, the fact that customers and cloud are not necessarily in the same trusted domain brings many security concerns and challenges toward this promising computation outsourcing model [3] . First, customer's data that are processed and generated during the computation in cloud are often sensitive in nature, such as business financial records, proprietary research data, and personally identifiable health information, etc. While applying ordinary encryption techniques to these sensitive information before outsourcing could be one way to combat the security concern, it also makes the task of computation over encrypted data in general a very difficult problem [4] . Second, since the operational details inside the cloud are not transparent enough to customers [3] , no guarantee is provided on the quality of the computed results from the cloud. For example, for computations demanding a large amount of resources, there are huge financial incentives for the cloud server (CS) to be "lazy" if the customer cannot tell the correctness of the answer. Besides, possible software/hardware malfunctions and/or outsider attacks might also affect the quality of the computed results. Thus, we argue that the cloud is intrinsically not secure from the viewpoint of customers. Without providing a mechanism for secure computation outsourcing, i.e., to protect the sensitive input and output data and to validate the computation result integrity, it would be hard to expect customers to turn over control of their computing needs from local machines to cloud solely based on its economic savings.
Focusing on the engineering and scientific computing problems, this paper investigates secure outsourcing for widely applicable large-scale systems of linear equations (LE), which are among the most popular algorithmic and computational tools in various engineering disciplines that analyze and optimize real-world systems. For example, by applying Newton's method, to solve a system modeled by nonlinear equations converts to solve a sequence of systems of linear equations. Also, by interior point methods, system optimization problems can be converted to a system of nonlinear equations, which is then solved as a sequence of systems of linear equations as mentioned above. By "large," we mean the storage requirements of the system coefficient matrix may easily exceed the available memory of the customer's computing device [5] , like a modern portable laptop. In practice, there are many real-world problems that would lead to very large-scale and even systems of linear equations with up to hundreds of thousands [6] , [7] or a few million unknowns [8] . For example, a typical double-precision 50;000 Â 50;000 system matrix resulted from electromagnetic application would easily occupy up to 20 GBytes storage space, seriously challenging the computational power of these low-end computing devices. Because the execution time of a computer program depends not only on the number of operations it must execute, but on the location of the data in the memory hierarchy [5] , solving such large-scale problems on customer's weak computing devices can be practically impossible, due to the inevitably involved huge IO cost. Thus, resorting to cloud for such computation intensive tasks can be arguably the only choice for customers with weak computing power, especially when the solution is demanded in a timely fashion.
It is worth noting that in the literature, several cryptographic protocols for solving various core problems in linear algebra, including the systems of linear equations [9] , [10] , [11] , [12] , [13] , [14] have already been proposed from the secure multiparty computation (SMC) community. However, these approaches are in general ill suited in the context of computation outsourcing model with large problem size. First, all these work developed under SMC model do not address the asymmetry among the computational power possessed by cloud and the customer, i.e., they all impose each involved party comparable computation burdens, which in this paper our design specifically intends to avoid (otherwise, there is no point for the customer to seek help from cloud). Second, the framework of SMC usually does not directly consider the computation result verification as an indispensable security requirement, due to the assumption that each involved party is semihonest. This assumption is not true any more in our model, where any unfaithful behavior by the cloud during the computation should be strictly forbidden. Last but not the least, almost all these solutions are focusing on the traditional direct method for jointly solving the LE, like the joint Gaussian elimination method in [10] , or the secure matrix inversion method in [11] . While working well for small size problems, these approaches in general do not derive practically acceptable solution time for large-scale LE, due to the expensive cubictime computational burden for matrix-matrix operations and the huge IO cost on customer's weak devices (see discussions in Appendix D, which can be found on the Computer Society Digital Library at http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/ 10.1109/TPDS.2012.206).
The analysis from existing approaches and the computational practicality motivates us to design secure mechanism of outsourcing LE via a completely different approachiterative method, where the solution is extracted via finding successive approximations to the solution until the required accuracy is obtained. Compared to direct method, iterative method only demands relatively simpler matrix-vector operations with Oðn 2 Þ computational cost, which is much easier to implement in practice and widely adopted for largescale LE [6] , [8] , [15] . To the best of our knowledge, no existing work has ever successfully tackled secure protocols for iterative methods on solving large-scale systems of LE in the computation outsourcing model, and we give the first study in this paper. Specifically, our mechanism utilizes the additive homomorphic encryption scheme, e.g., the Paillier cryptosystem [16] , and allows customers with weak computing devices, starting from an initial guess, to securely harness the cloud for finding successive approximations to the solution in a privacy-preserving and cheating-resilient manner. For a linear system with n Â n coefficient matrix, the proposed mechanism is based on a one-time amortizable setup with Oðn 2 Þ cost. Then, in each iterative algorithm execution, the proposed mechanism only incurs OðnÞ local computational burden to the customer and asymptotically eliminates the expensive IO cost, i.e., no unrealistic memory demands. To ensure computation result integrity, we also propose a very efficient cheating detection mechanism to effectively verify in one batch of all the computation results by the cloud server from previous algorithm iterations with high probability. Both designs ensure computational savings for the customer. Our contributions are summarized below:
1. For the first time, we formulate the problem of securely outsourcing large-scale systems of LE via iterative methods, and provide mechanism designs fulfilling input/output privacy, cheating resilience, and efficiency. 2. Our mechanism brings computational savings.
Within each iteration, it incurs OðnÞ computation burden for the customer and demands no unrealistic IO cost, while solving large-scale LE locally incurs Oðn 2 Þ per-iteration cost in terms of both time and memory requirements [8] . 3. We explore the algebraic property of matrix-vector operations to design a batch verification mechanism, which allows customers to verify all results of previous iterations from cloud in one batch. It ensures both the efficiency advantage and robustness of the design. 4. The experiment on Amazon EC2 [17] shows our mechanism helps customers achieve up to 2:22 Â savings when the sizes of the LE are relatively small (n 50;000). Better efficiency gain can be easily anticipated when n goes to larger size. In particular, when n ¼ 500;000, the anticipated savings can be up to 26:09Â. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the system and threat model, and our design goals. Then, we provide the detailed mechanism description and security analysis in Sections 3, 4, and 5. Section 6 gives the performance evaluation, followed by Section 7 which overviews the related work. Finally, Section 8 gives the concluding remark.
PROBLEM STATEMENT
System and Threat Model
We consider a computation outsourcing architecture involving cloud customer and cloud server illustrated in Fig. 1 . The customer has a large-scale LE problem Ax ¼ b, denoted as È ¼ ðA; bÞ, to be solved. However, due to the lack of computing resources, he cannot carry out such expensive (Oðn Þð2 < 3Þ) computation locally. Thus, the customer resorts to cloud server for solving the LE problem. For data protection, the customer first uses a secret key K to map È into some encrypted version È K . Then, based on È K , the customer starts the computation outsourcing protocol with CS, and harnesses the cloud resources in a privacy-preserving manner. The CS is expected to help the customer finding the answer of È K , but supposed to learn as little as possible on the sensitive information in È. After receiving the solution of encrypted problem È K , the customer should be able to first verify the answer. If it's correct, he then uses the secret K to map the output into the desired answer for the original problem È.
As later we shall see in the proposed model, the customer still needs to perform a one-time setup phase of encrypting the coefficient matrix with relatively costly Oðn 2 Þ computation. 1 But it is important to stress that this process can be performed under a trusted environment where the weak customer with no sufficient computational power outsources it to a trusted party. (Similar treatments have been utilized in [18] ). The motivating example can be a military application where the customer has this one-time encryption process executed inside the military base by a trusted server, and then goes off into the field with access only to untrusted CS. Another example can be the customer has the system modeling coefficient matrix A encrypted on his company's workstation, and then uses his portable device outside while still hoping to make timely decisions (derive solutions x i ) based on different observation b i in the field, for i ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; s. Thus, to make the rest of the paper easier to catch, we assume that CS is already in possession of the encrypted coefficient matrix, and the customer who knows the decryption key hopes to securely harness the cloud for on-demand computing outsourcing needs, i.e., solving LE problems fAx ¼ b i g.
The security threats primarily come from the malicious behaviors of CS, which may behave beyond "honest-butcurious" model as assumed by other works on cloud security (e.g., [19] , [20] , [21] ). In addition to being interested in learning the sensitive input/output information of È, CS can behave unfaithfully or intentionally sabotage the computation, e.g., to lie about the result to save the computing resources, while hoping not to be caught.
Design Goals
To enable secure and practical outsourcing of LE under the aforementioned model, we have the following design goals: 1) Input/output privacy: No sensitive information from the customer's private data can be derived by the cloud server during faithfully performing the LE computation; 2) Robust cheating detection: Output from faithful cloud server must be verified successfully by the customer. No output from cheating cloud server can pass the verification with nonnegligible probability. 3) Efficiency: The local computation burden, in terms of both time and memory requirements, for the customer should be much less than solving the original LE on his own.
Preliminaries and Notations
Iterative Method
In many engineering computing and industrial applications, iterative method has been widely used in practice for solving large-scale LE [6] , and sometimes is the mandatory choice [15] over direct method due to its ease of implementation and relatively less computational power consumption, including the memory and storage IO requirement [8] . We now review some basics on the general form of stationary iterative methods for solving LE problems. A system of linear equations is written as
where x is the n Â 1 vector of unknowns, A is an n Â n (nonsingular) coefficient matrix, and b is an n Â 1 right-hand side vector (so called constant terms). Most iterative methods involve passing from one iteration to the next by modifying a few components of some approximate vector solution at a time until the required accuracy is obtained. Without loss of generality, we focus on Jacobi iteration [15] here and throughout the paper presentation for its simplicity. Though extensions to other stationary iterative methods can be possible, we don't study them in the current work. We begin with the decomposition:
where D is the diagonal component, and R is the remaining matrix. Then, the (1) can be written as Ax ¼ ðD þ RÞx ¼ b, and finally reorganized as:
According to the Jacobi method, we can use an iterative technique to solve the left hand side of this expression for x ðkþ1Þ , using previous value for x ðkÞ on the right hand side. If we denote iteration matrix T ¼ ÀD À1 Á R and c ¼ D À1 Á b, the above iterative equations can be represented as
The convergence is not always guaranteed for all matrices, but it is the case for a large body of LE problems derived from many real-world applications [15] .
Homomorphic Encryption
Our construction utilizes a semantically secure encryption scheme with additive homomorphic property. Given two integers x 1 and x 2 , we have
In our implementation we adopt the Paillier cryptosystem [16] . For a vector x ¼ ðx 1 ; x 2 ; . . . ; x n Þ T 2 ðZ Z N Þ n , we use EncðxÞ to denote the coordinate-wise encryption of x: EncðxÞ ¼ ðEncðx 1 Þ; Encðx 2 Þ; . . . ; Encðx n ÞÞ T . For some n Â n matrix T, where each of the component T½i; j in T is from Z Z N , we denote the component-wise encryption of T as EncðTÞ, and we have EncðTÞ½i; j ¼ EncðT½i; jÞ.
THE BASIC SOLUTION
In this section, we start with a basic outsourcing solution based on direct method. The basic solution is described under the general framework consisting of three phases: (ProbTransform, ProbSolve, ResultVerify). The analysis of this basic solution gives insights and motivations on our main mechanism design based on iterative methods. Specifically, in the ProbTransform phase, the customer picks a random vector r 2 IR n as his secret keying material. Then, he rewrites (1) 
To hide the coefficient matrix A, the customer selects a random invertible matrix Q with the same size as A. Left multiplying Q to both sides of Ay ¼ b 0 give us
where A 0 ¼ QA and b 00 ¼ Qðb þ ArÞ. Clearly, as Q and r are chosen randomly and kept as secret, cloud has no way to know ðA; b; xÞ, except the dimension of x.
The customer can then start the ProbSolve phase by outsourcing È K ¼ ðA 0 ; b 00 Þ to the cloud, who solves È K and sends back answer y. After verifying the correctness of y, the customer can derive the original x via x ¼ y À r.
Remark. While achieving the input/output protection, this approach is not attractive for the following reasons:
1) The local problem transformation cost for matrix multiplication QA is Oðn 3 Þ, which is comparable to the cost of solving Ax ¼ b [22] . Considering the extra cost of ResultVerify, the discussion of which we intentionally defer to a later Section 5, there is no guaranteed computational saving for the customer.
2) The local cubic time cost can become prohibitively expensive when n goes large to the orders of hundreds of thousand. Besides, it violates our assumption in Section 2 that the customer cannot carry out expensive Oðn Þð2 < 3Þ computation locally.
In the recent literature [23] , [24] , Atallah et al. have proposed works for secure outsourcing matrix multiplication using only Oðn 2 Þ local complexity. However, in practice those works can hardly be applied to our case of calculating Q Á A for (3). The reason is that in their works, either noncollusion servers are required [23] , or scalar operations are expanded to polynomials and thus incur huge communication and computation overhead [24] . Both assumptions are difficult to be met in practice. (See detailed discussion at Section 7).
THE PROPOSED SOLUTION
The above observation and discussion shows that direct method-based approach might not be a good option for resource-limited customers for secure outsourcing largescale LE with computational savings in mind. This motivates us to design secure outsourcing mechanism using iterative method. To better facilitate the mechanism design to be explored next, we first make some general but nonstringent assumptions about the system as follows:
1. We assume the coefficient matrix A is a general nonsingular matrix that ensures a solution to the system after convergence of iterative approximations. 2 For simplicity, one such example for A is to be a strictly diagonally dominant matrix. Note that this is not a stringent requirement, as many real-world formulated LE problems satisfy this assumption, such as the statistical calculations [25] , the radar cross-section calculations [6] , etc. 2. Although proper preconditioning techniques (e.g., [5] , [6] , [7] , [8] , [15] ) on the coefficient matrix A can significantly improve the performance of iterative method, we do not study the cost of these techniques in this paper. As we focus on the security design, we assume the coefficient matrix A already ensures fast enough convergence behavior, i.e., the number of iterations L ( n. 3. We assume the matrix A is first transformed to (2), and then stored in cloud in its encrypted form EncðTÞ via an additive homomorphic encryption. As stated in our system model, this one-time setup phase is done before ProbTransform phase by some trusted workstation under different application scenarios. Hereinafter, we may interchangeably use the two forms of coefficient matrix A or T without further notice. 4. For ease of presentation, we defer the cheating detection to Section 5.
Problem Transformation
For protection of result x, the customer who has coefficient vector b and seeks solution x satisfying Ax ¼ b cannot directly start the ProbSolve with cloud. Thus, we need a transformation technique to allow the customer to properly hide such information first. Similar to the basic mechanism, in the ProbTransform phase, the customer picks a random vector r 2 IR n as his secret keying material, and rewrites (1) as the new LE problem
where y ¼ x þ r and b 0 ¼ b þ Ar. Clearly, the solution x to (1) can be found by solving a transformed LE problem in (4), and vice versa. At this point, both the output x and input tuple b have been well hidden by random vector r. Next, we reformulate (4) into the iterative form similar as (2): 
The Iterative Problem Solving
After the problem transformation step, now we are ready for the ProbSolve phase. Our goal is to let the customer securely harness the cloud for the most expensive computation, i.e., the matrix-vector multiplication T Á y ðkÞ in (5) for each algorithm iteration, k ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; L. Since it is an iterative computing process, we only describe the very first round of the process as follows. We leave the analysis of convergence and input/output protection in later sections. In what follows, we assume our main protocol of solving LE works over integers. All arithmetic is modular with respect to the modulus N of the homomorphic encryption, and the modulus is large enough to contain the answer. Details on how to handle noninteger numbers is given in Appendix A, available in the online supplemental material.
1.
T½i; j Á y
EncðT½i; jÞ Remark. In each iteration, the dominant customer's computation overhead is to decrypt the vector of EncðT Á y ðkÞ Þ, which takes OðnÞ complexity, and in general does not require expensive IO cost. This is theoretically less than the Oðn 2 Þ cost demanded by the matrix-vector multiplication T Á y ðkÞ of (5) in terms of time and memory requirements. Note that the theoretical computation efficiency gain can only be exhibited when the problem size n goes large, since the decryption computation is generally more expensive than the plaintext arithmetic operation. But large-scale LE is exactly the case we are focusing on by using iterative methods. Later in Section 6, we show performance results and discuss the possible selections of the size n for the problems. Also note that the communication overhead between the customer and the cloud is only two vectors of size n for each iteration, which is reasonably small.
Convergence Analysis
When dealing with iterative methods, it is a must to determine whether and when the iteration will converge.
Since we assume the matrix A ensures convergence, to determine the termination, the customer tests if ky ðkÞ À y ðkþ1Þ k ; ð7Þ
for some small enough > 0. And the termination point y ðkþ1Þ will help get the final result x via x ¼ y ðkþ1Þ À r. The local computation cost for each iteration is still OðnÞ.
Input/Output Privacy Analysis
Output Privacy Analysis
From above protocol instantiation, we can see that throughout the whole process, the cloud server only sees the plaintext of y ðkÞ , the encrypted version of matrix EncðTÞ, and encrypted vectors EncðT Á y ðkÞ Þ, k ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; L. Since y is a blinded version of original solution x, it is safe to send y to the cloud in plaintext. No information of x would be leaked as long as r is kept secret by the customer. Note that this analysis can be easily extended to the case of outsourcing a series of equations fAx ¼ b i g, since for each individual Ax ¼ b i , an independently picked random r i can be used to protect the output privacy accordingly.
Input Privacy Analysis
While the output is protected well, it is worth noting that some knowledge about the input tuple È k ¼ ðT; c 0 Þ could be implicitly leaked through the protocol execution itself. The reason is as follows: for each two consecutive iterations of the protocol, namely, the kth and the ðk þ 1Þth, the cloud server sees actually the plaintext of both y ðkÞ and y ðkþ1Þ . Thus, a "clever" cloud server could initiate a system of linear equations via (5) and attempts to learn the unknown components of T and c 0 . More specifically, for the total L iterations, the cloud server could establish a series of ðL À 1Þ Â n equations from y ðkÞ , k ¼ 0; 1; . . . ; L À 1, 3 while hoping to solve n 2 þ n unknowns of T and c 0 . However, as we have assumed in Section 4 that various preconditioning techniques can ensure fast enough convergence behavior, we have the number of iterations L ( n. (In fact, if L is close or even larger than n, there would be no advantage of using iterative method over direct method at all.) As a result, from the ðL À 1Þ Â n equations, the n 2 þ n components of T and c 0 is largely underdetermined and cannot be exactly determined by any means. Thus, as long as the cloud server has no previous knowledge of the coefficient matrix A, we state that such bounded information leakage from ðL À 1Þ Â n equations can be negligible, especially when the size of problem n goes very large.
In fact, we can further enhance the guarantee of input privacy by introducing a random scaling factor a k 2 Z Z N for each iteration to break the linkability of two consecutive iterations of the protocol. Here, the choice of a k should not introduce overflows with respect to the large arithmetic modulo N. Specifically, instead of sending y ðkÞ to the cloud server, the customer sends a k Á y ðkÞ for the kth iteration of the ProbSolve. When the cloud server sends back the encrypted value Encða k Á Ty ðkÞ Þ, the customer just simply decrypts the vector of a k Á Ty ðkþ1Þ , divides each component with a k , and then updates the next approximation y ðkþ1Þ via (5). Similarly, for the next iteration another random scaling factor a kþ1 is multiplied to y ðkþ1Þ before sent to the cloud server.
Remark. With the random scaling factor a k , the original value of y ðkÞ is well protected via a k y ðkÞ . Thus, the cloud server can no longer directly establish linear equations from received a k y ðkÞ and a kþ1 y ðkþ1Þ , but a series of nonlinear equations with extra random unknowns a 1 ; a 2 ; . . . ; a L . While this method further enhances the guarantee of input privacy by bringing extra randomness and nonlinearity of the system equations, it does not incurs any expensive operation, making the customer's local computation cost still OðnÞ within each iteration. Finally, we should note that the above analysis on the input privacy does not affect the output protection of x. This is because the random secret r protects x from y and the original constant term b from transformed c 0 .
CHEATING DETECTION
Till now, the proposed protocol works only under the assumption of honest but curious cloud server. However, in many cases, an unfaithful cloud server could sabotage the protocol execution by either being lazy or intentionally corrupting the computation result. Next, we propose to design result verification methods to handle these two malicious behaviors. Our goal is to verify the correctness of the solution by using as few as possible expensive matrixvector multiplication operations. In the following, we denote z ðkÞ ¼ T Á y ðkÞ as the expected correct responses, andẑ ðkÞ ¼ T Áŷ ðkÞ as the actual received value from cloud server, where k ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; L. We also assume L L, meaning the ResultVerify phase is initiated within at most L iterations.
Dealing with Lazy Adversary
We first consider detecting the laziness of cloud server. Since computing the addition and multiplication over encrypted domain could cost a lot of computational power, the cloud server might not be willing to commit servicelevel-agreed computing resources in order to save cost. More severely, for the kth iteration, the adversary could simply reply the result z ðkÀ1Þ of the previous ðk À 1Þth iteration without computation.
As a result, the customer who uses z ðkÀ1Þ to update for the next y ðkþ1Þ will get the result y ðkþ1Þ ¼ y ðkÞ . Consequently, he may be incorrectly led to believe the solution of equation Ay ¼ b 0 is found. Thus, for the malicious adversary, only checking the (7) is not sufficient to convince the customer that the solution has converged. According to (4) one further step has to be executed as
Remark. This checking equation incurs the local cost of Oðn 2 Þ for customer. While potentially expensive for large size of n, we should note that it does not have to be executed within every iteration. It only needs to be tested after the test on y ðkÞ and y ðkþ1Þ via (7) is passed. If (7) is not passed, it means y ðkþ1Þ is not the convergence point yet. On the other hand, if (7) is successfully passed, we can then initiate the test of (8) . If (8) holds, we say the final solution is found, which is x ¼ y ðkþ1Þ À r. If it doesn't, we can tell that the cloud server is cheating (being lazy). In either case, this matrix-vector multiplication of (8) only needs to be executed at most once throughout the protocol execution.
Dealing with Truly Malicious Adversary
While a lazy adversary only sends previous result as the current one, a truly malicious adversary can sabotage the whole protocol execution by returning arbitrary answers. For example, the malicious cloud server could compute (6) via arbitrary vectorsŷ ðkÞ other than customer's y ðkÞ . In the worst case, it would make the protocol never converge, wasting the resources of the customer. Thus, we must design an efficient and effective method to detect such malicious behavior, so as to ensure the result quality. The straightforward way would be to redo the matrix-vector multiplication T Á y ðkÞ and check if it equals to the receivedẑ ðkÞ for each iteration k. This is not appealing since it consumes equivalent amount of resources in comparison to that of computing the results directly. Below we utilize the algebraic property of matrix-vector multiplication and design a method to test the correctness of all received answersẑ ðkÞ ¼ T Áŷ ðkÞ , k ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; L in only one batch, i.e., using only one matrixvector multiplication. Note that batch verification is not a new idea and has been studied in cryptographic contexts, e.g., fast digital signature verifications [26] .
Suppose after L iterations, the solution still does not converge. The customer can initiate a ResultVerify phase by randomly selecting L numbers, 1 ; 2 ; . . . ; L from B & Z Z N , where each k is of l-bit length and l < log N. He then computes the linear combination over the y ðkÞ 's, which he has provided in the previous k iterations, 
The above equation can be elaborated as follows:
Since each k is chosen randomly from B ¼ f0; 1g l & Z Z N , we have the following theorem capturing the correctness and soundness of the cheating detection method: Theorem 1. The result verification (9) holds if and only ifẑ ðkÞ ¼ T Á y ðkÞ for all k ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; L, with error probability at most 2 Àl .
Proof. See Appendix C, available in the online supplemental material. t u
Remark. It is easy to tell that the computation overhead of (9) is only bounded by one matrix-vector multiplication of the left-hand-side of the equation (recall L L ( n).
The size of l is a tradeoff between efficiency and security. While a conservative choice of high security should probably require l around 80 bit, for a fast check a reasonable choice of 20 bits of l is also acceptable [27] . Note that in practice this result verification does not need to happen very frequently, because the property of batch verification ensures the quality of all previous received values fẑ ðkÞ ¼ T Áŷ ðkÞ g, k ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; L. Thus, the customer can preset the threshold L as sufficiently large such that either he detects the unfaithful behavior of cloud server or the program will converge soon after L iterations. In the best case, (9) only needs to be instantiated once. Combined with (8), we can see that our method for cheating detection indeed achieves as few as possible expensive matrix-vector multiplication operation. As a result, the overall design asymptotically eliminates the expensive IO cost on customer throughout the successive approximation process for seeking the solution as well as result verification.
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
We implement our mechanisms using C language. Algorithms utilize the GNU Scientific Library, the GNU Multiple Precision Arithmetic Library, and the Paillier Library with modulus N of size 1,024 bit. The customer side process is conducted on a laptop with Intel Core 2 Duo processor running at 2.16 GHz, 1 GB RAM, and a 5,400 RPM Western Digital 250 GB Serial ATA drive with an 8 MB buffer. The cloud side process is conducted on Amazon Elastic Computing Cloud (EC2) with High-Memory instance type [17] . Our randomly generated diagonally dominant test benchmark focuses on the large-scale problems only, where n ranges from 5,000 to 50,000, and serve for the purpose of validating the performance of the design. To ensure good condition number and the convergence of solutions, we first generate a random matrix with coefficient ranges from À1 to 1 and then add it with a diagonal matrix with large diagonals, e.g., 100 in case of n ¼ 20;000 . The scaling factor for real numbers is set to be 10 3 (See Appendix A, available in the online supplemental material). The solutions are all converged within 50 iterations when termination threshold ¼ 0:001. Since the computation dominates the running time as evidenced by our experiment, we ignore the communication cost. All results represent the mean of 10 trials. In order to handle large-scale matrix-vector operations, proper matrix splitting approaches are used, which demonstrates how the IO cost could significantly downgrade the performance if the whole computation is solely performed on the customer's local machine.
Problem Transformation Cost
We first summarize the cost for customer performing ProbTransform. As shown in Section 4.1, the transformation cost is dominated by the two matrix-vector multiplication in (5) . Note that when n goes large, the resulted matrix would be too large to be hold in customer's local machine memory. Thus, the matrix-vector multiplication cannot be performed in one step. Instead, the matrix has to be split into multiple submatrices, and each time only a submatrix can be loaded in the memory for computing a portion of the final result. In our experiment with 1 GB RAM laptop, we split the matrix into submatrices with 200 MB each. This has taken into account the memory occupation from OS load-up and easy in-memory operations and suits the assumption of weak customer device. The time results for different problem sizes are shown in Table 1 . For the largest benchmark size n ¼ 50;000, the problem transformation only costs around 22 minutes on our laptop. Compared to the baseline experiment where the customer solves the equation by himself (shown in the next section), such computational burden should be considered practically acceptable. And it can be easily amortized throughout the overall iterative algorithm executions for getting one problem solution, when we compare the customer's local average computation cost per iteration.
Local Computation Comparison
In our protocol by harnessing the computation power of cloud, the dominant operation in each iteration for customer is only to perform n decryptions. If the customer solves the problem by himself, which is the baseline of our comparison, the dominant computation burden within each iteration would be the matrix-vector multiplication with the input size The asymmetric speedup is the ratio of the time cost in the baseline over the time cost in the proposed scheme, which captures the customer efficiency gain. The entry with "Â" indicates the positive efficiency gain is achieved. n 2 . We compare the two computation cost in Table 2 , where both timing results and estimated memory consumption for each single algorithm iteration are reported. Note that the reported measurements are the average per-iteration cost, which have taken into account the problem transformation in amortized fashion already. To better present the trend of the efficiency gain between the two experiments, the timing comparison results are also plotted in Fig. 2 .
To have a fair comparison, again we have to consider the memory requirements incurred by the two operations. In particular, when n goes large, the IO time has to be taken into consideration. Similar to the transformation cost test, in our baseline experiment, each matrix is split into submatrices with 200 MB each for easy in-memory arithmetic operation. In this way, when performing the matrix-vector multiplication for a 50;000 Â 50;000 matrix with 20 GB space, at least 100 times expensive IO operations for a 200 MB submatrix have to be performed, which significantly increases the total time cost in our baseline experiment, as shown in Fig. 2 . On the other hand, our proposed scheme only demands local n decryption operations, which does not have such demands. For 1,024 bit key, each ciphertext is of size 2,048 bit, i.e., 256 byte (see Section 2.3.2). Therefore, holding the 50;000 Â 1 encrypted vector only needs 50;000 Â 256 Bytes < 13:0 MB memory, which can be easily satisfied by modern portable computing devices. Thus, the total local computation cost simply goes linearly with the problem size n. To show possible tradeoffs between security and performance, we also conduct the experiment with reduced key length of the Paillier cryptosystem. This is motivated by applications where only short term guarantees of secrecy (the coefficient matrix of A) may be required. (See short key experiments in [28] , [29] , for example.) Thus, if the customer accepts a smaller key length, the total timing will be reduced.
We can see that the crossover point occurs around n ¼ 48;000 for a 1,024 bit key and n ¼ 22;000 for a 768 bit key in Fig. 2 , where the trend of the efficiency gain among OðnÞ and Oðn 2 Þ is also clearly shown. In case of 768 bit key, when n ¼ 50;000, the customer's local computation cost in the baseline experiment would be 2:22 Â more than the proposed scheme. Note that n ¼ 50;000 is not an unreasonably large matrix. Many real-world application, e.g., problems from electromagnetic community, could easily lead to a dense system of linear equations with more than 200,000 unknowns [8] . Though in this work we didn't try problem size larger than 50,000, the better efficiency gain for larger scale problems can be easily anticipated from the clear trend among OðnÞ and Oðn 2 Þ shown in Fig. 2 . For example, when n ¼ 500;000, the anticipated computational saving for customer can be up to 26. 09 Â . Note that the choice of in-memory storage does not affect the theoretical analysis on the computation gain. Also, from the experimental observation, as long as n goes large, i.e., for largescale LE problems, the computational savings can always be expected by the customer.
Cloud Computation Cost
The cloud side computation cost for each iterated algorithm execution is given in Table 3 . The third and forth columns lists the cloud computation time when there is only one instance running. However, as stated in Appendix A.3, available in the online supplemental material, we can utilize the cost associativity of cloud computing to speedup the cloud server computation via task parallelization without introducing additional cost to customers. Thus, the fifth and the sixth columns lists the estimated cloud computation time when multiple t Amazon EC2 instances are running simultaneously. By configuring a proper choice of t ¼ 100, even for the largest size of the problem n ¼ 50;000, the cloud side computation can be finished within around 20 minutes for each round. Given the security property our mechanism has provided, such time cost can be deemed reasonable.
RELATED WORK
Recently, a general result of secure computation outsourcing has been shown viable in theory [18] , which is based on Yao's garbled circuits [30] and Gentry's fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) scheme [31] . However, applying this general mechanism to our daily computations would be far from practical, due to the extremely high complexity of FHE operation and the pessimistic circuit sizes that can hardly be handled in practice. Instead of outsourcing general functions, in the security community, Atallah et al. explore a list of customized solutions [23] , [24] , [32] for securely outsourcing specific computations. In [32] , they give the first investigation of secure outsourcing of numerical and scientific computation, including LE. Though a set of problem dependent disguising techniques are proposed, they explicitly allow private information leakage. Besides, the important case of result verification is not considered. In [23] , Atallah and Bejanmin give a protocol design for secure matrix multiplication outsourcing. The design is built upon the assumption of two noncolluding servers and thus vulnerable to colluding attacks. Later on in [24] , Atallah and Frikken give an improved protocol for secure outsourcing matrix multiplications based on secret sharing, which outperforms their previous work [23] in terms of single server assumption and computation efficiency. But the drawback is that due to secret sharing technique, all scalar operations in original matrix multiplication are expanded to polynomials, introducing significant communication overhead. Considering the case of the result verification, the communication overhead must be further doubled, due to the introducing of additional precomputed "random noise" matrices. In short, these solutions, although elegant, are still not efficient enough for immediate practical uses on largescale problems, which we aim to address for the secure LE outsourcing in this paper. Wang et al. [33] give the first study of secure outsourcing of linear programming in cloud computing. Their solution is based on problem transformation, and has the advantage of bringing customer savings without introducing substantial overhead on cloud. However, those techniques involve cubic-time computational burden matrix-matrix operations, which may not be handled by the weak customer in our assumption. Very recently, Blanton et al. [34] explored secure outsourcing allpair distance calculations of large-scale biometric data. Their focus is on result verification, which leverages certain structures of the distance computations and the framework of adding fake items and random sampling.
Difference from conference version [1] . First, we provide a new mechanism design on secure outsourcing LE via direct method in Section 3. Second, we thoroughly discuss the series of practical techniques and mechanism parameter considerations when implementing the mechanism for specific applications in Appendix A, available in the online supplemental material. Third, we provide extended literature survey on data computation delegation and result verification in Appendix D, available in the online supplemental material. Fourth, we provide a complete yet rigorous security proof for the Theorem 1 in Section 5.2 and Appendix C, available in the online supplemental material. Finally, we greatly improved the performance evaluation with more clarified experimental settings and evaluation comparison.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we investigated the problem of securely outsourcing large-scale LE in cloud computing. Different from previous study, the computation outsourcing framework is based on iterative methods. In particular, the design requires a one-time amortizable setup phase with Oðn 2 Þ cost, and then each following iterative algorithm execution only incurs OðnÞ local computational cost with the benefits of easyto-implement and less memory requirement in practice. We also investigated the algebraic property of the matrix-vector multiplication and developed an efficient and effective cheating detection scheme for robust result verification. Thorough security analysis and extensive experiments on the real cloud platform demonstrate the validity and practicality of the proposed mechanism.
